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Tax havens and tax secrecy have risen to the top of the global policy agenda and may 
constitute the most important impediment for reducing inequalities. Moreover, 
complex corporate structures allow charging for services undertaken in various 
countries through one low-tax country. Transferring profits to low-tax jurisdictions 
will significantly reduce a multinational corporation’s overall tax burden. Individuals 
are assisted in opening shell corporations that officially own bank accounts where the 
real owner (beneficial owner) is not revealed. Reducing this practice of tax dodging 
(which encompasses both legal tax avoidance and illegal tax evasion) has proven to 
be difficult, despite substantial efforts by several international organizations and 
states over the last decade. It is too easy to be removed from the list of tax havens; 
mere membership in OECD’s Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of 
Information for Tax Purposes qualifies. Tax dodgers add to global inequalities and 
severely weaken states’ capacity to undertake their task of creating a solid tax base, 
embedded in the principle that all actors are taxed according to the income 
generated in each country. A weak tax base will lead to less trust, more violence and 
more deaths.  
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High-profile revelations (LuxLeaks and Panama Papers) prove that a segment of the 
population in most countries actually lives in a parallel society, removed from the 
norms that others seek to comply with. Using tax advisors, many of whom work for 
the “Big Four” accounting firms (Deloite, Ernst & Young, KPMG, PWC), these 
individuals do everything possible to enrich themselves rather than contributing to 
well-functioning states, crucial infrastructure and life-saving services.  
People working on tax justice issues were not surprised at these disclosures; on the 
contrary, these revelations confirm what has been known for a long time. By 
contrast, both politicians and the CEOs of financial institutions in Western 
countries appeared surprised. Their surprise is objectively unfounded, as they have 
had enough information to understand and act for a long time. Interestingly, 
decision-makers in developing countries and countries in transition rank tax 
avoidance as the most crucial measure to reduce inequality (UNDP 2013: 210). Two 
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other tax-related issues scored lowest (taxing finance) and middle (tax incentives for 
foreign direct investments), the latter being explicitly warned against in the 2015 
Addis Ababa Action Agenda of the Third International Conference on Financing 
for Development (2015 Addis Ababa; United Nations 2015: paragraph 26).  
While inequality was included in the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), as 
SDG 10, the targets and indicators do not refer explicitly to tax, which is probably 
the most important measure for reduced inequality. The 2015 Addis Ababa does, 
however, give a broad mandate for “redoubling efforts to substantially reduce illicit 
financial flows… by combating tax evasion and corruption…” (United Nations 
2015: paragraph 23). “Country by country reporting,” specifying profits and other 
information for each country (EU 2016a), and automatic exchange of tax 
information are all recommended (United Nations 2015: paragraph 27; see also 
paragraph 29). The United Nations is not, however, the most important 
international actor; rather the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD; United Nations 2015: paragraph 28) and the Financial 
Action Task Force (FATF; United Nations 2015: paragraph 24) specify states’ 
obligations in greater detail.  
Tax dodging is the term applied in this article; it encompasses tax avoidance and 
tax evasion. Tax dodging is the preferred term, as it is not always initially obvious 
whether a specific practice is morally dubious tax avoidance or illegal tax evasion. 
There are various approaches to assess the global amount of tax dodging. OECD 
holds that up to 10 percent of global corporate income tax revenues are not being 
paid due to profit shifting to low-tax jurisdictions or tax havens, representing a total 
loss of up to USD 240 billion annually (OECD 2016: paragraph 68). 
This figure is roughly the same as the total income that is lost by individuals’ 
fortunes being hidden from taxes (USD 21 trillion), based on a calculation of an 
ordinary tax payment at a 3-percent rate of return on this fortune (Tax Justice 
Network 2012: 2). The Norwegian Commission on Capital Flight from Developing 
Countries (2009: 64) says that illicit capital flows from developing countries alone 
totaled USD 641-979 billion annually, referring to Kar and Cartwright-Smith 
(2008), but the figure used in their final report is actually USD 850-1000 billion 
(Kar and Cartwright-­‐Smith 2008: vi). Irrespective of this mismatch of figures, they 
exceed the total Official Development Assistance (ODA) (142 billion USD; OECD 
2017) and migrant workers’ remittances (USD 595 billion; World Bank 2017) to 
developing countries. Note that these figures do not include what is lost each year 
due to corruption, much of which is also ending up in tax havens. 
This article proceeds as follows:  First, it presents basic justifications for taxation, 
identifying the tax challenges raised by economic globalization. Second, it identifies 
the most crucial obstacles for effective tax collection, particularly for transnational 
corporations. Third, it reviews OECD, Norwegian, EU and US measures. Fourth, it 
reviews how measures against money laundering and public procurement processes 
can reduce tax dodging. Next, I identify factors indicating a higher awareness of tax 
dodging. I conclude by suggesting an ethical approach to tax dodging.  
This article seeks to answer the research question: How does the widespread 
practice of tax dodging contribute to greater global inequalities and weakening of 
states, and how can tax dodging be effectively combated? 
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Basic justifications for taxation 
Taxation has never been popular, but taxes have been crucial for the formation of 
the modern state system, as well as for democracy. When people pay taxes, they 
demand influence over how the money is spent. As these demands were gradually 
addressed, modern parliaments emerged as a result. The slogan “no taxation without 
representation” came out of the English Revolution (1689), inspiring cries for 
democracy in other countries in subsequent centuries. Moreover, broad-based 
taxation creates mutual trust that is decisive for the functioning of state institutions, 
so that these institutions are inclusive and not extractive, the latter designed by the 
elites “to extract resources from the rest of the society” (Acemoglu and Robinson 
2012: 81).  
Given this background, it is easy to agree with U.S. Supreme Court Associate 
Judge Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., who stated in 1904: “Taxes are the price we pay 
for a civilized society” (IRS (Internal Revenue Service) 2016). The best-functioning 
states, with the lowest levels of inequalities, are simultaneously the states with the 
best ability to collect taxes. Taxation raises the awareness of being a part of a larger 
community, with the overall benefits that this implies. Weak states, faulty 
infrastructure and poor services are a direct function of inadequate tax collection 
(Fukuyama 2014; 2011). 
This relationship can be illustrated in a positive spiral (from Johnson 2011): 
                          
Tax payment, according to this understanding, is embedded in social contract 
theory, where everyone contributes to the public good, hence enabling public 
institutions to distribute and invest resources to facilitate and improve the 
functioning of individuals and enterprises.  
Egalitarianists, represented by Wilkinson and Pickett (2009) and Piketty (2014) 
have presented strong arguments on the importance of distribution through 
taxation, and particularly Wilkinson and Pickett have been subject to criticism for 
selectively choosing countries and variables (Snowdon 2010; Saunders 2010; in 
support of most of the original findings, see Hiilamo and Kangas 2014). 
Those who express principled criticism of taxation can come from various 
ideologies, but the dominant school is libertarianism (Fraser 2000; Rothbard 1982; 
Nozick 1974). The main argument of all of these critics is that by taxing its citizens, 
the state is using force to take something that belongs to someone and using it for 
someone else’s purposes. For Nozick this “something” is part of the fruit of one’s 
labor, while for Rothbard it is one’s property. Fraser, agreeing with both of them, 
ends up endorsing anarcho-capitalism (Fraser 2000: 234). The issue of consent is 
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crucial for libertarians. Anyone who does not agree with the principle of taxation 
nevertheless has to obey the duty to pay taxes – as specified and practiced by the 
majority – with the possibility of punishment for non-compliance.  
The task of tax collection becomes more difficult in a globalized economy. The 
multitude of domiciles of multinational corporations (MNCs) implies that a wide 
range of bilateral tax treaties have been entered into, primarily with the purpose of 
avoiding double taxation. A much bigger problem, as will be shown below, is the 
way MNCs are organized and operate, and how individuals consciously seek to 
conceal themselves as the real owners (“beneficial owners”) of bank accounts.  
 
Crucial obstacles for effective tax collection 
MNCs can choose to locate in low-tax jurisdictions or outright tax havens.  The 
strategies for the two differ. It is therefore necessary to distinguish between the two, 
the former relating to tax avoidance, and the latter relating to tax evasion. 
Low-tax jurisdictions are characterized by low tax rates, and frequently market 
themselves as such, but are otherwise normally functioning economies. Relevant 
examples include Ireland and the Netherlands. For an MNC that seeks maximum 
profit, the more overall income that can be ascribed to these countries, the better. 
Therefore, taxation is minimized by having all activities that do not depend on a 
specific location in the low-tax jurisdictions. By charging excessively high prices on 
these services, only minimal profits are reported in normal-tax jurisdictions where 
the main part of an MNC’s activities take place. This strategy thus substantially 
reduces the total tax payment by taxing a large part of the total income in low-tax 
jurisdictions. 
The MNC may manage internal services – such as marketing, custom relations, 
design development and intellectual property – in the low-tax jurisdictions. For 
example, when Microsoft customers in any country in Europe or the Middle East 
pay their invoices to the Microsoft office in Luxembourg for all services done by 
Microsoft employees, a huge gap exists between Microsoft’s actual activities in a 
country like Norway and Microsoft’s income as reported to Norwegian tax 
authorities.  
This situation makes it almost impossible for wholly nationally domiciled 
corporations to compete on fair terms, as their overall tax burden makes them much 
less profitable compared to an MNC that can shift the payment for many of its 
services to low-tax jurisdictions. 
Tax havens are identified by the Financial Secrecy Index (Tax Justice Network 
2018a). The index is composed of 20 secrecy indicators (Tax Justice Network 
undated), as well as a global scale weight. The top three countries in 2018 are 
Switzerland, USA and the Cayman Islands.  
Tax havens are characterized by secrecy, parallel taxation regimes between 
nationals and foreigners, and often the prohibition of substantive activities or 
owning of properties in the tax havens by foreigners. Various tax haven lists exist, 
but the Financial Secrecy Index shows that not only small island states harbor tax 
havens. 
Tax havens have been the subject of considerable attention over the last decade. 
Running the risk of being declared a “non-cooperative tax haven” has made them 
eager to enter into agreements on automatic exchange of tax information with 
other states. The three last tax havens on the OECD list of non-cooperative tax 
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havens were all European: Andorra, Liechtenstein and Monaco. They were removed 
from this list in 2009. 
Some tax havens have specialized in providing services enabling joint financing 
of investments taking place in other countries. As an example, investments from 
the Norwegian Norfund, the government’s main instrument for combating poverty 
in developing countries through private sector investments, invest in Eastern 
African countries through Mauritius. According to Norfund, this makes the 
investments financially safer, and makes it easier to co-finance with other investors 
(Bistandsaktuelt 2016; E24 2016).1 
This, and the fact that the Norwegian Pension Fund and Argentum, a Norwegian 
government enterprise that holds minority shares in private equity funds, have 
increased their investments in tax havens, implies that the Norwegian government 
is indirectly legitimizing tax havens. 
Tax havens seek to attract foreign capital as a strategy to improve their nation’s 
own socioeconomic development. Money laundering of incomes originating from 
criminal and other illegal activities is easy to do through tax havens. Being associated 
with money laundering not only harms such states’ overall reputation, but may 
make them ineligible for investments. Many governments in tax haven nations are 
particularly eager to fight money laundering. The FATF, which also has a mandate 
relating to terror financing, has for the last years listed Iran and North Korea as 
non-cooperative jurisdictions. Counter-measures against Iran have been suspended 
since June 2016, but Iran will remain on the FATF Public Statement until the full 
Action Plan on anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism 
has been implemented (FATF 2018). Despite the fact than many tax havens actively 
engage in anti-money-laundering activities, the secrecy that tax havens provide – 
since the real owners are hidden, and “board members” can be chosen from a list 
provided by the tax haven’s authorities – facilitate money laundering. 
Important financial centers like Switzerland or the City of London might not be 
able to know who is actually the real owner of the bank accounts opened in any of 
their banks. The City of London Corporation is an “autonomous jurisdiction” of 
1.22 square miles (Shaxson 2011: 247) for its 9000 inhabitants and 350 000 daytime 
employees, having been a self-governing municipal entity for more than 800 years.  
Notwithstanding the differences between the various tax havens, the overall 
problem is that they allow money to be hidden from domestic tax authorities. This 
implies that many states are either looted by kleptocrats or depleted of revenues that 
should have benefited of the inhabitants, as well as the effective working of its 
institutions.  
Abolishing the system of tax havens would not solve the problems of money 
being taken from one jurisdiction to another for the purpose of reducing tax, but 
such “tax competition” would be manageable, unlike the current global system of 
hiding money. 
 
Measures that reveal MNCs’ profits and taxes in all jurisdictions – 
and their inadequacies 
A full review of all possible measures to curb tax dodging is beyond the scope of this 
article. This section will analyze recent initiatives within country-by-country 
reporting, where the company must in principle provide information on activities, 
profits and revenues in all countries where it operates. There are many exceptions to 
this, as will be seen. 
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The OECD has updated its 1992 Model Convention with Respect to Taxes on 
Income and on Capital ten times since its adoption, most recently in November 
2017. The 1998 Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in 
Tax Matters was updated in 2010 to improve the exchange of information and so 
far, more than 100 states participate in the Convention (some have only signed and 
not ratified). Moreover, OECD oversees the Global Forum on Transparency and 
Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes with a total of 132 members. Merely 
being a member implies that a state is not considered a tax haven (Klassekampen 
2016). Using a two-phased review, with criteria for information availability, access 
and exchange, states are placed in five different categories (ranked order): 
complying, largely complying, partially complying, qualifying, and not qualifying. 
A map of a state’s results in two “rating rounds” is available (OECD 2018). We see 
that the OECD has extraterritorial influence far beyond its member states. 
The OECD’s most recent initiative is known by its acronym BEPS (Base Erosion 
and Profit Shifting). This initiative seeks to avoid the practice of transferring its 
profits to low-tax jurisdictions. Four of fifteen identified “Actions” address so-called 
transfer pricing, which are intra-corporation transactions where prices are 
manipulated with the purpose of dodging taxes. The last BPES Action is to develop a 
multilateral instrument to modify bilateral tax treaties so that they include BEPS 
provisions. 
Undoubtedly, the OECD has a strong commitment to fighting tax dodging. We 
saw above that two OECD conventions have occurred since the 1990s. Despite these 
efforts, the Tax Justice Network calculates that the amount of private wealth kept in 
tax havens doubled in the years between 2005 and 2010, representing an increase of 
16 percent each year (Tax Justice Network 2012: 2). This rapid increase happened 
even though OECD efforts were widely known, at least among lawyers and tax 
advisors. Moreover, the exchange of tax information system requires specific 
identification of given persons. If the tax authorities are to obtain relevant 
information, it is necessary to reveal the names of the persons suspected of tax 
dodging.  
BEPS Action 13 on country-by-country reporting apparently has a 
comprehensive scope, requiring annual reports for each tax jurisdiction in which 
companies do business. The report encompasses revenue, profit before income tax 
and income tax paid, as well as total employment, capital, retained earnings and 
tangible assets. However, this information is only required to be provided to tax 
authorities, implying that the information is not for the public. Moreover, the 
requirements apply only to MNCs with an annual consolidated (total) revenue of 
EUR 750 million or more (OECD 2015: 4). Hence, most MNCs are exempted.  
These weaknesses are obviously a reflection of the political will among the 
member states. Norway requires information in line with BEPS Action 13 (Norway 
2013, § 3) if the corporation has a consolidated revenue of NOK 320 million (USD 
40 million), a balance sheet of NOK 160 million (USD 20 million) and at least 250 
employees (Norway 2013 § 1; two of three requirements must be met). As we see, 
the threshold is substantively lower than the EU threshold, but nevertheless rather 
high. Moreover, the reporting requirement does not apply to jurisdictions in which 
the MNC’s subsidiaries only have “supportive functions” (Norwegian Parliament 
2013), which must be understood as tax havens.  
While the EU has country-by-country reporting, its requirements were less 
detailed than those outlined by the OECD, and limited to the extractive industries 
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(EU 2013a) and the financial sector (EU 2013b). In the aftermath of the Panama 
Papers, the EU decided to initiate country-by-country reporting for the whole EU, 
but only for corporations with an annual turnover of more than EUR 750 million 
(EU 2016a), similar to the OECD threshold referred to above.  
The USA was the first country to require disclosure of payment to all 
governments, but only to those states where the activities take place. Section 1504 
of the Dodd-Frank reform act was challenged by the American Petroleum Institute 
(The Guardian 2015), and the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has 
adopted new provisions, effective from 2016 (US SEC 2016). 
Hence, while it is too early to evaluate the BEPS program in each country or on a 
global level, substantial challenges remain, primarily as regards secrecy.  
  
Further changes? Anti-money laundering and tax specifications in 
public procurements 
While legislative changes have so far not been able to curb the practice of tax 
dodging, there are several ways to proceed. These relate primarily to revealing the 
identities of the real owners of offshore shell companies and require that the overall 
corporate structure be revealed.  
Anti-money laundering efforts seek to prevent money stemming from illegal 
activities from becoming part of the ordinary economy and thus being impossible to 
trace. In addition, the EU has since 2004 emphasized non-fulfillment of tax 
obligations as a justifiable reason to exclude a corporation from public procurement 
contracts, provided that tax payment obligations are clearly outlined in the tender 
specification. We will review these two efforts in this order.  
Overall efforts to fight money laundering and terrorism financing is most 
comprehensively regulated in the Fourth directive on money laundering (EU 2015), 
which applies to financial institutions and credit institutions, as well as auditors, 
accountants, tax advisors, estate agent and public employees, such as notaries. The 
strictest requirements are with financial institutions and credit institutions, as 
specified by Article 19. Financial institutions and credit institutions involved in 
breaches of the obligations outlined in the Directive that are “serious, repeated, 
systematic, or a combination thereof” can be subject to pecuniary sanctions of least 
EUR 5 million or 10 % of the total annual turnover, in accordance with Article 
59.3(a).  
The main focus of the Directive is “customary due diligence”, or knowing who is 
the actual owner of a property, shell company or bank account. To gain information 
about the real owners (Article 3.6), a register of such beneficial owners must be 
established in each state (Article 30.3). While this is not specified in the Directive 
itself, it is crucial that such a register be open to everyone (Tax Justice Network 
Norway 2015). Non-governmental organizations, academics and investigative 
journalists can all provide critical assistance, provided that they have adequate access 
to information.  
This article will identify whether specifying the fulfillment of tax obligations in 
tenders of public procurements is a possibility, and whether excluding a corporation 
from public procurement contracts is conceivable. At the core of the analysis is how 
to comply with EU (and EEA) public procurement obligations.  
Already in 2004 the now repealed public procurement directive (EU 2004) 
specified in Article 45.2(f): 
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Any economic operator may be excluded from participation in a contract 
where that economic operator […] has not fulfilled obligations relating to 
the payment of taxes in accordance with the legal provisions of the country 
in which he is established or with those of the country of the contracting 
authority. 
 The crucial term is “obligations.” What is required to determine that tax 
payment obligations have not been fulfilled? The specification that the obligations 
are either read out from “legal provisions of the country in which he is established or 
with those of the country 
of the contracting authority” makes it relevant to ask when it became a legal 
obligation to comply with these provisions. Moreover, is the establishment of a 
complex corporate structure with the purpose of substantively reducing an MNC’s 
tax obligations to be considered as not fulfilling this MNC’s legal obligations?  
To the first question, one might take a legal positivist approach and say that this 
is when some given domestic legislation – such as incorporating a country-by-
country reporting requirement and with specific sanctions for inadequate reporting 
or tax payment – enters into force. One might take another approach, based on the 
evolving international norms of morality and transparency in tax matters. Since the 
issue in public procurement is not about punishing law violators, but rather about 
instilling tendering competitions based on fair terms, it seems as if the legal 
positivist approach cannot be the only approach. Faced with one or more tenderers 
who are paying 50 percent less in tax than other tenderers with similar turnovers, 
this does not represent fair competition, even if such a practice might not be illegal 
as specified in the legislation.  
A related question may help to answer question two above: should a public 
contractor require an MNC participating in the tender to provide specific 
information on the corporate structure in different jurisdictions, with as detailed 
information as is required in the BEPS Action 13’s country-by-country reporting 
requirements and the new EU requirements (EU 2016a)? This is obviously relevant 
in order for the public contractor to assess whether the tenderer has “fulfilled 
obligations relating to the payment of taxes.” 
To answer this question, Article 27.1 in the now repealed Directive 2004/18/EC is 
interesting. It states that the contracting authority may provide information on “the 
body or bodies from which a candidate or tenderer may obtain the appropriate 
information on the obligations relating to taxes.” Hence, the tenderer should be 
assisted in identifying information on obligations relating to taxes. 
The new public procurement directive that repealed the 2004 Directive specifies 
with regard to payment of social security contributions and taxes that “an additional 
certificate may be required of any registered economic operator whenever a contract 
is to be awarded” (EU 2014: Article 64.5). Hence, taxation is considered to be a 
complex kind of information that might require the economic operator or tenderer 
to provide supplementary information. 
We saw that exclusion from public procurement processes was possible under the 
previous Directive. A similar provision on exclusion is also included in the new 
Directive (EU 2014: Article 57.2), but only if the contractor “is aware that the 
economic operator is in breach of its obligations relating to the payment of taxes…” 
and requiring that “this has been established by a judicial or administrative decision 
having final and binding effect…” Exclusion can in accordance with the second 
paragraph of Article 57.2 also take place if such breach can be “demonstrated” by the 
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contracting authority. Interestingly, the Norwegian Regulation says that the 
exclusion from a procurement processes can take place also in the absence of a final 
judicial or administrative decision, unless such exclusion would be disproportionate 
(Norwegian Government 2016: § 24-2(3)a). The latter requirement (“unless … 
disproportionate”) was not in the draft Regulation (Norwegian Government 2015: § 
18-2(3)a). By including a “proportionality” requirement, the Norwegian Regulation 
is more demanding than the EU directive. 
The exclusion from public procurement can therefore be considered to be more 
difficult under the present EU public procurement directive as compared to the 
previous one.  
To be able to “demonstrate” breach of obligations relation to tax payments, 
public contractors must require the MNC tenderers to provide a full overview of its 
corporate structure, and request detailed information about each of the MNCs 
subsidiaries, in line with the requirements of BEPS Action 13. This is possible in 
accordance with Article 64.5 of the 2014 Directive. It is the level of specificity in the 
tender announcement, as formulated by the public contractor, that is decisive. It 
might be difficult for the MNC to provide all the information, or the MNC might 
actually not want to reveal all the information. 
Therefore, the public contractor can specify in the public procurement 
announcement that it will emphasize the tenderers’ overall tax obligations, by 
requiring that the totality of the corporate structure be revealed, with detailed 
information for each subsidiary. This can be justified with arguments relating to fair 
competition. This requirement might cause some potential tenderers to abstain from 
applying. When seeing the proposals from the different tenderers, the public 
contractor can determine that the contractor has adequate information or – if the 
contractor believes that the information is not adequate – ask an MNC tenderer for 
more information. This is a way that public authorities can promote tax 
transparency and fight tax dodging.  
 
Greater awareness concerning tax dodging 
While the previous sections have identified the many changes in the law in recent 
years and clarified how tax justice can be promoted by public contractors, there are 
real challenges for promoting tax justice and fighting tax dodging globally.  
First, many of the tax havens with small economies are highly dependent upon 
their financial sectors, as they have a non-diversified economy. Second, many tax 
havens are found in large economies, such as the United Kingdom (City of London) 
and the USA (Delaware and Nevada). These states also tend to be cautious about 
pushing for changes that will result in unemployment. Third, economic crimes, with 
the exception of narcotics financing and terrorist financing, are simply not given 
the necessary attention. Fourth, the fact that the “Big Four” accounting companies 
employ some of the world’s leading tax advisors and best financial investigators, and 
simultaneously lead the development of international norms’ – particularly the 
International Financial Reporting Standards and the International Accounting 
Standards – implies that the states depend on these companies for any progress. 
This realistic side of the equation is balanced by other aspects. First, governments 
express an increasing acknowledgement of the dangers of tax dodging for the 
survival of welfare states and states’ overall performance. The importance of 
institutions for economic growth is convincingly shown in the Norwegian 
Commission on Capital Flight from Developing Countries (2009). Moreover, cuts 
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in public spending have been shown in an IMF (International Monetary Fund) 
study to lead to reductions in production in the private sector of one and a half to 
three times the predicted figure (Blanchard and Leigh 2013). The concerns over 
payments in publicly financed welfare services – some ending up in tax havens – led 
the Norwegian Parliament in December 2017 to request the Norwegian 
Government to establish a public commission to map “money flows” in these 
services (Norwegian Parliament 2017a: 5). 
Second, consumers have hardly started to “vote with their wallet” against tax 
dodgers. For instance, the practice of Den Norske Bank (DNB) – where the 
Norwegian state is the main owner – having offices in tax havens has been known 
for several years. Nevertheless, it has not acted on strong recommendations from 
the Norwegian government, and its customers have been loyal to the bank. After 
the Panama Papers revealed that the DNB office in Luxembourg facilitated a private 
person’s establishment of shell companies in the Seychelles for the purpose of not 
revealing the real owners of bank accounts in Luxembourg, a survey found that 67 
per cent had lower trust in DNB (VG 2016). Somewhat surprisingly, the drop in 
trust was lowest among those aged 18 to 29.  
Third, the development of digital tools will make it easier to exchange 
information and fight tax dodging. Another aspect of digital development is the 
increase in digital payments. Reduced use of cash and increasing use of credit cards 
does correlate with reduced crime rates in the USA (Wright and others 2014). A 
Norwegian study found that only 37 to 47 percent of cash holdings in Norway 
could be linked to lawful, registered purposes (Gresvik and Kaloudis 2001; see also 
Norges Bank 2010). Already in 2002, the OECD predicted that “money’s destiny is 
to become digital” (OECD 2002: 7). Hence, digital payments are good for 
transparency and preventing tax dodging. 
 
An ethical approach to tax dodging 
As seen above, tax dodging overwhelmingly takes place due to the inadequacies of 
regulation at national and global levels. Therefore, when discussing tax dodging 
practices and how to counter them, it is relevant to emphasize measures in the global 
context. The social contract argument mentioned above can be linked to 
egalitarianism, but it applies primarily to the national level and not to the global 
level. 
Is there any applicable social contract theory that could be applied to the global 
level? Cosmopolitanism has presented strong arguments for new global approaches 
to taxation (Pogge 2014: 77-78; Pogge 2011: 29-30). The crux of cosmopolitanism 
is that “all human beings, regardless of their political affiliation, are (or can and 
should be) citizens in a single community” (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
2013).  According to Pogge, by condoning “lax accounting standards” and 
accepting “illicit deposits” (Pogge 2011: 29), banks and rich states are complicit in 
harmful tax and embezzlement practices. He states that these entities are not doing 
enough to change harmful practices by reforming international institutions or by 
compensating the victims of such practices. As was seen initially, decision-makers in 
developing countries and countries in transition rank tax avoidance as the most 
crucial measure for reduced inequality (UNDP 2013: 210).  
Other cosmopolitans have emphasized a humanity-based rather than an 
institutional cosmopolitanism. A review of this line of reasoning concludes that it is 
“difficult to specify what duties and costs an individual should be expected to bear 
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… beyond ‘negative’ duties not to collaborate with unjust global institutions” 
(Langford and Darrow 2013: 438). These negative duties apply to individuals who 
are in charge of tax obligations of corporations for which they work, as well as their 
own tax obligations.  
According to Langford and Darrow, Nobel Laureate in economics Amartya Sen 
has also presented cosmopolitan thinking, primarily through his book The Idea of 
Justice (2009). His main argument is that the various forms of cross-border 
exchange and contacts imply that political considerations cannot be “confined to 
the citizenry of any given country, ignoring all others” (Sen 2009: 403). Sen, best 
known for his entitlement theory (Sen 1981) and his theory of development as 
freedom (Sen 1999), has been widely acclaimed for identifying factors that impede 
and enhance development prospects on the domestic level, but his cosmopolitan 
thinking remains “undertheorized,” according to Langford and Darrow (2013: 440). 
Hence, this brief review shows that while there are legitimate concerns over lack 
of effective participation and influence in global decision-making, lack of effective 
sanctions for harmful practices, and lack of compensation, extending the social 
contract theory to the global level faces real challenges. Langford and Darrow’s 
analysis is embedded in the so-called extraterritorial obligations of states, defined as: 
obligations relating to the acts and omissions of a State … that have effects 
on the enjoyment of human rights outside of that State’s territory; and … 
obligations … to take action, separately, and jointly through international 
cooperation, to realize human rights universally (Extraterritorial Obligations 
Consortium 2012: para. 8). 
International cooperation and assistance for human rights realization is already 
recognized in Article 56 of the UN Charter and Article 2.1 of the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. This definition also identifies 
acts and omissions with effects outside of the state’s territory.  
Within the UN human rights system, it is the Special Rapporteur on extreme 
poverty and human rights who has presented the most comprehensive analysis and 
recommendations on tax reforms, including cooperating for enhanced transparency 
and information exchange (UN Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human 
rights 2015, paras. 52-53; UN Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human 
rights 2014). The reports have emphasized domestic tax policies, including 
potentially harmful tax incentives for companies (UN Special Rapporteur on 
extreme poverty and human rights 2014: para. 65) and references to states that have 
adopted taxes on certain types of cross-border financial transactions (UN Special 
Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights 2014: para. 96).  
The Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights has made no 
specific recommendations on domestically collected taxes for global purposes. Such 
taxes or levies are termed “innovative sources of finances” or “innovative taxation,” 
and the only such levy currently in operation is the air ticket levy. Eight countries 
currently charge this levy (Unitaid 2018), which provides half of the funding for 
Unitaid (2017: 15) that has as its motto “Innovation in global health.” A finance tax 
on shares, bonds and derivatives was set to be introduced in ten EU member states 
in 2016, but has been postponed. Some EU member states claim that this type of 
tax must apply to all EU member states (European Parliament 2017; see also Reuters 
2017). Interestingly, the United Kingdom, being one of the states expressing the 
strongest opposition to such a tax, has a long history of taxing the purchase of shares 
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through its so-called “stamp tax.” While the tax from 2008 only applies to purchases 
worth GBP1000 or more (UK Government 2014a), it has collected GBP 125.4 
billion since 2000 (UK Government 2017).   
Turning to the other ideological position raised earlier in this article, namely 
libertarianism, their main objection is on taxation at the domestic level. 
Interestingly, libertarianism is also embedded in human rights argumentation, 
primarily the human right to property and to a fair trial. While selecting a restricted 
number of human rights to the detriment of other human rights can justifiably be 
challenged, it is obvious that a well-ordered society needs respect of property and 
courts, in case contracts are not adequately enforced.  
Libertarianist views on reducing the share of the economy that goes through the 
state for redistribution and investments have been rejected in principle by two of 
the world’s richest people. We will use these individuals as examples in discussing 
whether tax dodging is an expression of greed. 
Warren Buffet pointed out the irony that he and other super-rich individuals in 
the USA paid less in federal taxes, as a portion of income, as compared to those with 
ordinary incomes. He therefore called for increased tax payments for the richest 
individuals. This led Barack Obama to propose the so-called “Buffet Rule” as part of a 
tax plan launched in 2011, setting a 30 percent tax for everyone with more than 
USD 1 million in annual income. The proposal was stopped in the Senate in 2012 
(US Administration 2012).2 
Bill Gates provides another interesting case. His wealth is partly based on 
Microsoft’s inadequate tax payments. This is possible through Microsoft’s overall 
corporate structure, in which services undertaken in one normal-tax country are 
charged in a low-tax country, allowing the whole Microsoft consortium to avoid 
billions of dollars in tax each year. Gates says that “tax systems are the primary thing 
that asks the most successful to fund the basics that we would like to have for 
everybody” (Gates 2015; 1:44-1:54), but the interviewer does not challenge him on 
Microsoft’s own tax practices. While Gates has devoted all his time, energy and 
money to the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation since he stepped down as CEO of 
Microsoft in 2000, his attitude nevertheless does appear hypocritical (The Guardian 
2014).  
Hence, one can be positive to the need to fund the state in order to enable it to 
undertake its responsibilities – or in human rights terminology, to fulfill its human 
rights obligations – but nevertheless be complicit in setting up corporate structures 
that undermine this very ability of the state.  
Such practices of creative corporate structures are increasingly being challenged. 
The EU Commission found in 2016 that Ireland was violating EU rules on state aid, 
a decision that Ireland has appealed.  By its low tax rate, Ireland has granted undue 
tax benefits of up to EUR 13 billion to Apple Inc. and must now recover this illegal 
state aid (EU 2016b). Even the CEOs in the technology companies admit that the 
tax system is flawed and should be reformed (The Guardian 2018). A new measure 
to tax digital services – also termed an “equalization levy” – was proposed by the EU 
in March 2018 and is expected to lead to an estimated EUR 5 billion in revenues 
(EU 2018). This proposal does not include measures for imposing a “source tax,” in 
other words taxation based on activities and income generated in each country 
(Norwegian Ministry of Finance 2018; see also Norwegian Parliament 2017b). Such 
a source tax is a step towards so-called “unitary taxation” or “formulary 
apportionment” that is promoted by Tax Justice Network (2018b). 
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The super-richest individuals, 62 of whom control as much wealth as the poorest 
50 percent of the world’s population, or 3.6 billion persons (Oxfam 2016), pay very 
low tax amounts because their capital is hardly taxed. Concentration of wealth is 
happening rapidly. In 2010, the 382 richest persons’ wealth matched that of the 
world population’s poorest half. Some of the super-rich themselves want to be taxed 
more, like Warren Buffet – as seen above – but politicians prevent such reforms 
from taking place. Moreover, not all efforts to reduce one’s tax burdens are 
illegitimate. For instance, strategic forms of personal savings that also give tax 
reductions are fully within the law, but inadequate reporting and information 
exchange facilitate tax avoidance. Hence, both formally legal tax avoidance and 
formally illegal tax evasion represent considerable challenges. 
The Oxfam Report on global inequalities concludes with five specific 
recommendations to fight tax havens and end secrecy: agreeing on a UN tax body; 
ending the practice of tax incentives (UNDP 2013: 210); requiring country-by-
country reports that are publicly available; establishing public registers of 
corporations’ beneficial owners; and creating a multilateral system for automatic 
exchange of tax information (Oxfam 2016: 34-35).  
Not all aspects of these recommendations can be comprehensively assessed, but 
some critical points will be highlighted. First, when balancing between 
representativeness and effectiveness, sometimes effectiveness should prevail. An 
intergovernmental body within the UN might not necessarily be as effective as the 
OECD has proven to be. To be clear: although the OECD is not adequately 
effective, the UN might not be similarly effective, but the UN must nevertheless 
strengthen its work to fight harmful tax dodging. 
Second, it is crucial that the financial reports showing tax payments in all 
jurisdictions and registries of beneficial owners be made publicly available. While the 
Norwegian publishing of tax payments of all citizens was found to violate the 
human right to privacy (NRK 2012), one can obtain information on the 100 
individuals with highest incomes in each municipality. Such transparency must also 
apply to companies.  
Third, it is important that the exchange of tax-related information should not 
require tax authorities requiring information to identify the persons, their identity 
numbers, and their bank account numbers. Easing exchange of tax information 
without such rigid requirements will make it easier to trace and recover hidden 
wealth.  
Hence, the explanation for the current practices of tax dodging must be sought 
in more than merely greed. As indicated at the start of the article, recent revelations 
actually show that a large segment of rich persons and their advisors live in parallel 
societies. In these parallel societies taxes are not perceived as ethically important. 
They might distrust “big government” and feel that their own interests are not 
adequately taken care of. Spending a great deal of time abroad might further 
contribute to this detachment from complying with one’s tax duties. Such practices 
are exacerbated by legal and institutional inadequacies to counter tax dodging at 
both national and international levels. 
 
Conclusion 
So how does all this relate to the death aspect of Midas’ gift? Midas’ desire for riches 
turned out to be a curse as everything he touched, even his daughter, became gold. 
This fairytale shows that our material desires might actually harm us. Pursuing greed 
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through tax dodging might in the long term harm everyone, as states become less 
able to function for the benefit of its inhabitants. Strong and efficient states, 
accountable institutions, and public policies based on the rule of law have been 
found to be crucial for political order and stability (Fukuyama 2014; 2011). Those 
involved in economic transactions are especially dependent upon all these factors.   
Hence, while the state does not always contribute to effective redistribution and 
is biased toward the rich, it is still the most effective instrument for overall societal 
development. The state achieves this through institutions that improve the 
functioning of the economy and by building the necessary trust, both horizontally – 
between the inhabitants – and vertically – between inhabitants and decision-makers. 
This is in turn achieved through the adequate payment of taxes. While tax dodging 
is garnering more attention than ever before, many hurdles must still be overcome 
for adequate tax payment to take place, as this article articulates.  
The inability of the current tax system to prevent the increase in global 
inequalities, by allowing the super-rich to remain super-rich, is a part of this 
problem. Tax payments, on the other hand, facilitate crucial services, better-
functioning institutions, increased trust, greater equality and less potential for 
violence.  
 
Notes 
1 Note that E24 applies the term “legitim” above the Fact box; it should instead read 
“illegitim”. 
2 The proposal initially received a majority of 51 votes, but due to filibuster tactics of 
certain Republicans, it did not receive the 60 votes required. 
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